Price discovery in US-Canadian cross-listed shares by Gilbert, A et al.
  
 
Price Discovery in US-Canadian Cross-listed Shares  
 
Bart Frijns*, Aaron Gilbert and Alireza Tourani-Rad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is a preliminary version. Please do not quote without permission 
 
1 July 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Corresponding Author. 
Department of Finance 
Auckland University of Technology 
Private Bag 92006, 1020 Auckland, New Zealand 
 
Email: bfrijns@aut.ac.nz 
 
Abstract 
Given the increasing integration of markets around the world, concerns have been expressed 
about the survival of smaller national exchanges in competition with larger, more liquid 
exchanges. Several theories have been put forward regarding the likely long-term survival of 
smaller exchanges, but little actual empirical evidence has been presented to suggest which of 
the theories, if any, are correct. We explore this issue within the setting of Canadian and US 
firms cross-listing onto each other’s exchanges using the component share measure of each 
exchanges contribution to price discovery. We look at Gonzalo and Granger (1995) 
component shares over a 14 year period from 1996-2009 and find that each market is on 
average informationally dominant for its own companies, with the exception of Canadian 
firms listing on the NASDAQ. We also find that there is considerable time variation in the 
component shares, but little evidence that the Canadian market is systematically losing 
competitiveness to the US exchanges as has been feared. We also find that known 
determinants of the level of price discovery appear unrelated to the changes in price 
discovery.  
 
Introduction 
 
In the past investors were largely restricted, based on the speed of information and national 
rules, to trading within their own country, or even more locally. As a result of globalization 
and technology we have seen information and regulatory barriers to international investment 
decrease, and as a result there has been a marked increase in competition between exchanges. 
In particular, exchanges are competing for international investors, who increase the liquidity 
and activity on an exchange, and for cross-listings. The process of competition has resulted in 
efforts being made to lower transaction costs, improve efficiency and promote economic 
growth (Steil, 2002). A very visible effect of the competition has been the merger of national 
exchanges into ever increasing exchange groups such as the NYSE Euronext or the 
NASDAQ OMX.  
 
The creation of such large exchange groups spanning continents and time zones however has 
raised questions about the long term survivability of smaller exchanges. These smaller 
exchanges lack the efficiencies of larger exchanges and risk losing local companies to larger 
exchanges in an effort to improve liquidity and prices for their securities (PR Newswire, 
1988). Several competing theories have been proposed for the future of smaller national 
exchanges, ranging from predictions of their eventual demise (Carpentier et al., 2008) to a 
dramatic reduction in their numbers with the survivors taking specialized roles (Coffee, 
2002). However, empirical evidence on the effects of competition on exchanges, and the idea 
that some exchanges are clearly losing, is limited and in some cases contradictory.  
 
In this paper we explore the competitiveness of a smaller national exchange in competition 
with larger exchange groups. In particular, we look at the competition between the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX) and the three main US exchanges the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX. 
Competition between the Canadian and US exchanges offers a good opportunity to look at 
issues around the survivability of smaller exchanges due to the highly integrated nature of the 
two markets, which makes it very easy to list and also allows investors easy access to other 
countries exchanges. We evaluate the impact on the two exchanges by looking at relative 
contributions of the various exchanges to the price discovery of cross listed stocks. We 
identify not only Toronto Stock Exchange listed companies that are cross-listed in the US but 
also US listed firms cross-listed on the TSX for a 14 year period from 1996 to 2009. We start 
at 1996 as this is the earliest period for which we can get intra-day data. For each year we 
calculate Gonzalo and Granger (1995) component shares to measure the relative contribution 
of each exchange to the price discovery process. This will allow us to examine how the 
contributions to price discovery of the Canadian and US exchanges have evolved over the 
sample period, and to shed some light on the future prospects of smaller exchanges in light of 
the dire predictions of Carpentier et al. (2002) and others.  
 
Our findings show little evidence that the Toronto Stock Exchange is systematically losing 
ground to the US exchanges, either in relation to price discovery or trading and liquidity 
measures. We do however find that there is time variation in the contributions to price 
discovery of the various exchanges. Specifically, we find that the home exchange dominates 
price discovery, but for Canadian companies the overall average Canadian component share 
reaches a low point in 2006 at which point the US is slightly dominant. However, particularly 
during crisis periods we see that price discovery migrates to the Canadian exchange, 
particularly during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The patterns also differ depending on 
the exchange firms are listing to or from. In particular we find that the AMEX exchange has 
lost competitiveness to the TSX fairly consistently over the sample period. We also find only 
mixed evidence that the change in component shares are related to changes in trading and 
liquidity measures, in particular relative spreads, trading and quoting activity and volume 
traded. Overall the results appear to support the findings of Harris et al. (2002) that the 
competitive position of exchanges will ebb and flow as they compete.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature on the 
survival of small exchanges and price discovery. Sections 3 and 4 outline the methodology 
and the data employed respectively, along with giving some summary statistics on cross-
listings between the two countries. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes the 
paper.  
 
1. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Exchange Competition 
Several theories have been expressed regarding the likely future for small national exchanges 
in competition with larger exchanges. Carpentier et al. (2008), Gaa et al. (2001) and DiNoia 
(2001) all speculate that what could arise from this consolidation process is the creation of a 
single super-exchange, spanning the globe and allowing for 24/7 trading. In the process, they 
argue that this super-exchange would dominant and eventually strip national exchanges of the 
most liquid and attractive firms leaving only the illiquid and small and in the process the 
exchanges attraction to investors. One concern expressed in these studies is the effect that the 
loss of a strong national exchange would have on the economic development of countries. In 
particular the loss of national exchanges could reduce the access to capital for small to 
medium sized companies who would be too illiquid to appeal to global investors (Carpentier 
et al., 2002; Ferrarini, 2002) and local exchanges would likely be too illiquid to service the 
needs of these firms. In addition weak local exchanges would reduce the economic 
development of the country (Marano, 2000) and reduce the domestic financial services 
industry with the resulting loss of expertise and high skilled employment (Carpentier et al. 
2002).  
 
Coffee (2002) offers a different vision, suggesting that we will see the development of a 
small number of large exchanges. However, he also argues that rather than disappear, smaller 
exchanges will find niches within which to specialize. One example Coffee gives is in 
disclosure requirements, where other exchanges will be able to offer differing disclosure 
regimes that cater to the demands of firms. Disclosure requirements are one way that 
exchanges could specialize, or markets could seek to adjust listing rules to different industry 
needs in much the way that the NASDAQ developed as a high tech industry exchange. 
 
One study that offers some empirical evidence is Harris et al. (2002) who explores the 
relative price discovery contributions of the NYSE against regional US exchanges. The study 
observes that there was a competitive process resulting in an ebb and flow effect whereby, at 
some points in the time the contribution of the NYSE strengthened while in others it waned. 
The changes appeared to be related to efforts made by the different exchanges to attract 
liquidity and reduce transaction costs. Of note is the fact that despite being at a disadvantage 
against the NYSE, the regional exchanges were able to attract a greater share of price 
discovery in the middle time period (1992), suggesting they were able to compete. This raises 
the prospect that smaller exchanges need not become pure satellite markets for larger 
exchanges.  
 
The survivability of smaller national exchanges has been of particular concern to 
commentators in Canada, especially around the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and its 
competitive position against the larger US based exchanges like the NYSE and NASDAQ. 
The US and Canada have over a period of decades have undergone considerable integration, 
such that Canadian firms have easier access to US capital markets than those from other 
countries . As a result, substantial numbers of Canadian firms have cross-listed onto US 
security exchanges, around 2000 in 2006 (Carpentier et al. 2002), making them the largest 
group of foreign listings. In addition, cross-border transactions for investors should be 
relatively easy as well, allowing Canadian investors to seek the lowest cost market in which 
to trade. This level of integration between the US and Canadian markets offers an excellent 
opportunity to evaluate how other markets will fare around the world given the continuing 
trend towards market integration (de Brouwer, 2003). 
 
While significant concerns have been raised about the long-term competitiveness of the 
Canadian exchanges, the empirical evidence is mixed. Reguly (1999), for instance, argues 
that the liquidity on the TSX had dropped considerably and that the exchange was being 
hollowed out by Canadian companies listing in the US. Hendry and King (2004) also observe 
that 15% of TSX-listed firms have a cross-listing on a US exchange, and that trading on the 
US exchange accounts for nearly half the trading volume. However, Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist (2001) and Boisevert and Gaa (2002) note that up until around the early 2000’s 
the Canadian exchanges had enjoyed greater increases in exchange listings than many other 
exchanges, including the US. In addition the value of trading had increased 300% in a 5 year 
period (Boisevert and Gaa, 2002). It is far from clear, therefore, that the number of cross-
listings and the level of US trading activity are having a detrimental effect on the TSX, or that 
its long term survival is threatened despite the supposition of Carpentier et al. (2008) and 
others.  
 
2.2 Price Discovery 
Part of the difficulty in evaluating the effects of exchange competition and determining the 
relative importance of exchanges encompasses a number of facets including liquidity, spreads 
and information dissemination and creation. However, component shares and information 
shares, which break down the relative contributions to price discovery of various markets, 
offer one way of evaluating these factors.  Price discovery or the search for an equilibrium 
price is a key function of an exchange (Eun and Sabherwal, 2003). Effectively, price 
discovery is the process by which new information is impounded into prices. Bacidore and 
Sofianos (2002) argue that price discovery should largely occur in the home market, as this is 
the market in which information about the company is mostly created. However, this assumes 
investors will trade on that information in the home market, whereas investors in highly 
integrated markets have the ability to choose the cheapest trading venue when it comes to 
impounding information into prices. If this is the case, then it is likely the cheaper market will 
become the informationally more important market with prices in other markets adjusting to 
the cheap market prices. As a result, a cheaper and more liquid foreign market could also 
become the informationally dominant market making the home exchange largely irrelevant. 
The location of price discovery is also a concern for the exchanges themselves, with the 
Board of Governors of the TSX stating “the TSE cannot afford to have the US markets 
become the price discovery mechanism for Canadian interlisted stocks”. Price discovery 
therefore offers a measure by which the relative competitiveness and relevance of markets 
can be established and evaluated.  
 
There is a growing literature examining price discovery in a number of settings, particularly 
in looking at the price discovery of stocks listed on multiple exchanges. Initially, papers 
looked at the relative importance of exchanges within the US, particularly between the NYSE 
and regional exchanges (Harris et al., 1995; Hasbrouck, 1995). An interesting extension in 
Harris et al. (2002) looked at the relative price discovery contribution of the NYSE and 
regional exchanges at three points in time; 1988, 1992 and 1995. They find that price 
discovery contributions change over time, particularly in relation to changes in the 
competitive position of the various exchanges against each other. Specifically, they find that 
as the NYSE became relatively more expensive with regards to transaction costs in around 
1992, price discovery migrated to the regional exchanges. In 1995, once NYSE spreads had 
reduced, the NYSE regained some of its contribution to price discovery.  
 
A number of studies have also examined the location of price discovery for internationally 
cross-listed companies, specifically addressing the question of which is the informationally 
dominant market. Despite the assertions of Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) that the home 
market should dominate the price discovery, the empirical evidence is mixed. Lieberman et 
al. (1999) examined the price discovery of 6 Israeli firms cross-listed on the NYSE and found 
only a limited informational role for 5 of the firms. Su and Chong (2007) looked at eight 
Chinese firms listed on both the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the NYSE and also found 
only a limited informational role for the US exchange. Likewise Ding et al. (1999), who 
looked at Malaysian companies listed on the Singapore Exchange, Lok and Kalev (2006) and 
Frijns et al. (2010), who both study bi-directional listings between the Australian and New 
Zealand Stock Exchanges, find the home market dominates but that the foreign market has a 
small but significant role in price discovery.  
 
In contrast, Pascual et al. (2006) finds the NYSE has no role in price discovery for Spanish 
stocks, while Grammig et al. (2005) reaches the same conclusion with regards to German 
stocks listed on the NYSE. Effectively, in these markets the NYSE plays no informational 
role at all and is purely a satellite exchange. However, several studies have found that the 
foreign market plays a very important role in price discovery. Kadapakkam et al. (2003) in a 
study of Indian companies listed on the London Stock Exchange finds both markets 
contribute equally to price discovery. Meanwhile, Hupperts and Menkveld (2002) looking at 
Dutch firms cross-listed on the NYSE find wide variations on a per company basis, with 
some stocks dominated by the home market, some by the foreign market and others by both.  
 
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) examined price discovery for Toronto Stock Exchange stocks 
cross-listed on US exchanges for a six-month period in 1998 using Gonzalo and Granger 
(1995) component shares. As with the findings in Hupperts and Menkveld (2002), Eun and 
Sabherwal (2003) show wide variation in the contribution to price discovery of the US 
exchanges, averaging 38.1% but ranging from .2% to 98.2%. They also note that while the 
home exchange dominates in many cases, there are a number of companies whose price 
discovery is dominated by the US exchange, making the TSX a mere satellite exchange. The 
study then goes on to try and identify the determinants of price discovery, finding that price 
discovery is driven by the proportion of information trades occurring in the US. Lieberman et 
al. (1999) and Hasbrouck (1995) also show that the bid-ask spread ratio affects the level of 
price discovery.  
 
One weakness of the studies to date on price discovery, particularly in relation to measuring 
the effects of exchange competition on the future of smaller exchanges, is that most of the 
studies are snapshots in time, focusing on measuring price discovery in one relatively short 
period of time, typically less than a year. As such, changes over time in price discovery, and 
what may cause these shifts, have not really been examined in the literature. One study that 
did look at the development of price discovery over time was Frijns et al. (2010). The paper 
examines both New Zealand companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange and 
Australian firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange for the period between 2002-2007. The 
authors show that while the home market was dominant for both New Zealand companies 
listed in Australia the Australian companies listed in New Zealand, the Australian exchange 
was increasing its share of price discovery over time for both groups. This suggests that the 
New Zealand exchange is increasingly becoming a pure satellite market of Australia with 
information impounded in the Australian prices, albeit at a gradual pace.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
To study the informational role of the US and Canadian markets for US-Canadian cross-listed 
stocks we investigate the contribution to price discovery of both markets.  
 
Consider a single security that lists in 2 different countries (US and Canada). Let 
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tp  be the 
(log) price of the asset traded in the US market and expressed in US dollar. Similarly, let 
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tp  be the (log) price of the asset traded in the Canadian market expressed in US dollar. If 
the two assets are identical and completely fungible, then arbitrage implies that the price 
difference )( CANt
US
t pp   is bounded with probability 1. Stated differently, if the prices 
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tt ppp  ) in the US and Canadian market are for the same asset then prices will be 
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assets implies that price changes can be expressed as an error correction model of the form 
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where  is the (2  1) vector of containing the speed of adjustment coefficients for US prices 
and Canadian prices and q are (2  2) matrices containing coefficients on lagged prices. 
Note that the specification of the cointegrating vector β, implies that we expect the first 
element of α, αUS ≤ 0 and the second element of α, αCAN ≥ 0.    
 
We obtain our price discovery measure from the VECM stated in Equation (1) by following 
the permanent-transitory (PT) decomposition of Gonzalo and Granger (1995).
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The first price discovery measure is based on the estimates from Equation (1) and is used by 
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) in their study on price discovery among US-Canadian cross-listed 
stocks and compares the speed of adjustment coefficients of the two markets. The lower the 
speed of adjustment coefficient, the more informative that market can be assumed to be. For 
example, if the US market is completely dominant and the Canadian market is a pure satellite 
market, then we expect αUS = 0 and αCAN > 0. Vice versa, if the Canadian market is 
completely dominant and the US market is a pure satellite, then we expect |αUS| > 0 and αCAN 
= 0. If neither market is completely dominant |αUS| and αCAN will both be positive, but their 
relative magnitudes will give us an indication of the degree of dominance over the other 
market. Based on Eun and Sabherwal (2003) we therefore define the following measure for 
price discovery, 
 
CANUS
US
USPD
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
1 ,         (2) 
 
4. Data 
We obtain data on all Canadian TSX-listed firms that are (or have been) cross-listed on one 
of the three main US markets: NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. For these firms, we collect 
intraday data from the Thompson Reuter Tick History database (TRTH) maintained by 
SIRCA for the period 1996-2009, a sample period of 14 years.
2
 This data contains all trades 
and quotes (plus associated volumes) time stamped to the nearest thousandth of a second. We 
follow Grammig et al. (2005) and use the midpoints of quotes to study price discovery, as 
these are free from the bid-ask bounce that is normally observed in transaction prices. 
Subsequently, we convert all our prices into US dollars and sample our data at a one-minute 
frequency. 
 
                                                 
1
 An alternative would be to use the Information Shares defined by Hasbrouck (1995) 
2
 Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific. 
We use this data to compute price discovery measures for each stock in each year. However, 
before proceeding with the estimation of the error correction model we take several steps to 
filter the data. First, we exclude those cross-listings that have less than 40 days of quoting 
activity in both markets in a given year. This filter is applied to ensure that price discovery 
measures are representative for that given year. Second, we perform augmented Dickey-
Fuller (1981) (ADF) unit root tests for each stock and for each year. The concept of 
cointegration only becomes relevant when the time-series of stock prices in both markets are 
non-stationarity. Non-stationarity of the time-series is therefore a requirement for our 
cointegration analysis and we exclude any stocks for which the ADF test rejects the presence 
of a unit root (at the 5% level). Third, we perform the Johansen (1995) test for cointegration, 
where we test for the presence of no cointegrating relationships versus one cointegrating 
relationship and remove those firms in the years where the Johansen test does not reject the 
null of no cointegrating relationship. After cleaning the data in this way, we are left with 
1,381 firm year observations.  
 
In Table 1 we provide an overview of the number of cross-listings per year and per exchange. 
The sample starts with 43 cross-listed firms in 1996, grows to a maximum of 132 cross-
listings in total in 2007 before declining again to 121 cross-listings in 2009. However, the 
increase in cross-listings has not been uniform when we split the sample by the exchange on 
which the listing takes place. In the early parts of the sample period, most cross-listing 
occurred on the NYSE. However, during the period of the dot-com bubble, cross-listings on 
the Nasdaq grew considerably, with the Nasdaq having the most cross-listings in 2001.
3
 The 
Amex received little attention from cross-listed firms up to 2004, when this market saw a 
considerable increase in the number of cross-listings from Canadian firms. By the end of our 
sample period, 2009, most of the cross-listings in our sample are on the AMEX.   
< Insert Table 1 Here > 
 
Table 1 also provides an overview of the cross-listing numbers for US companies listing on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange. In contrast to large numbers of Canadian firms listing in the 
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This provides some evidence of the “market bubble explanation” as described by Coffee (2002). This 
explanation argues firms have cross-listed in the US markets to benefit from the overvaluation that occurred 
during the bubble. Since this bubble occurred most prominently among Tech-stocks, it is not surprising to see 
cross-listings increase on the Nasdaq. 
US, US companies listing on the TSX are considerably less common with just 20 in our 
sample at its peak. Further, we also do not see a considerable increase in the number of US 
firms cross-listings over the sample period. In 1996 there were just 7 US cross-listed 
companies, which grew to 12 in 1998 and remained around that level until a marked increase 
in 2007 when the number surged to 19. When we split the sample by exchange we again see 
differences over time in the originating exchange. The number of companies from the NYSE 
remains relatively stable over the sample period, with a decline in 2007 onwards. The 
NASDAQ is also relatively stable over time with small peaks in 1999 and 2007. For most of 
the sample period we see very few firms cross-list to the TSX from the AMEX, however, in 
2007 we see a significant jump in the number of companies, from 2 to 9 then to 11 in 2008.  
The jump in AMEX listings onto the TSX seem to be solely driving the increase in overall 
US companies cross-listing onto the Toronto exchange.   
 
5. Results 
 
To assess the level of price discovery for the cross-listed companies on the US and Canadian 
markets, we estimate the VECM on a yearly basis following the Johansen procedure, i.e. by 
estimating the auxiliary regressions and computing the canonical correlations. This provides 
us with Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimates for the coefficients in the VECM 
and also provides us with a direct way to compute the Component Shares, as the PT 
decomposition of Granger and Gonzallo (1995) follows directly from the canonical 
correlations.  
 
In Panel A of Table 2, we report the component shares of the Canadian market for Canadian 
firms cross-listed on the US markets. Panel A shows the overall component share and the 
Component Share per exchange. Overall, we see that the component shares are highest for the 
Canadian market at a value of about 57%. However, the Canadian market obviously does not 
dominate for all shares. The standard deviation of component shares is large at 22% and the 
range of component shares is very wide, with the minimum share at 2.7% and the maximum 
share at 99.4%. Our range in the component shares are similar to those observed in Eun and 
Sabherwal (2003). Component shares also seem to differ across the three US exchanges. The 
NYSE and Amex are quite comparable with mean Canadian component shares of 63% and 
66% respectively. For cross-listings on the NASDAQ, the Canadian component shares are 
lower at an average of about 44%. Hence for Nasdaq cross-listings, the US market seems to 
be more important in terms of price discovery. 
< Insert Table 2 Here > 
 
In Panel B of Table 2 we present the Canadian component shares for US firms cross-listed on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange. On average we see that the US exchanges dominate the 
Canadian market for price discovery with an average firm year component share of 38%. 
However, we observe very wide ranges with some firms dominated by the home market 
(1.2% component share) while for others the US market is a satellite market with most of the 
price discovery occurring in Canada (92% component share). We also observe some 
interesting patterns when we separate the firms by their home exchange. Average NYSE 
firms component shares are very similar to the full sample average, although they do have 
slightly less variation. Firms cross-listing from the NASDAQ, as with Canadian firms cross-
listing onto the NASDAQ, have a lower average component share indicating less of the price 
discovery occurs on the TSX for these firms. Given the industry specific nature of the firms 
on the NASDAQ, predominantly pharmaceutical and software based firms, this may suggest 
that the NASDAQ holds a competitive advantage in price discovery for these types of firms.  
In contrast to the two other exchanges however, the TSX dominates the AMEX for price 
discovery. On average 56% of price discovery occurs on the Canadian market. This is 
contrary to expectations as the US is both the home market, so should create most of the 
information, and is a larger and more liquid exchange than the TSX. Prevailing theories 
would predict that the US dominates, yet we observe that it is Canada that is dominant. 
Again, given the highly clustered nature of the firms listing to and from the AMEX it maybe 
that the TSX has a competitive advantage for resource based stocks.  
< Insert Figure 1 Here > 
 
With a few exceptions, Canadian firms listing on the NASDAQ and AMEX firms listing on 
the TSX, we observe that on average the home market dominates the price discovery process. 
This is broadly in line with much of the literature which finds that home market is the 
informationally important market. However, we also find that in all cases the foreign market 
has a significant albeit lesser role. The wide ranges also suggest that, while on average the 
home market dominates, for some companies the opposite is true. The findings are supportive 
of the earlier findings by Eun and Sabherwal (2003) on Canadian companies cross listing in 
the US. 
 
In Panel C of Table 2, we show the evolution of the Component Shares over time for both 
firms listing from and to the Canadian markets, for the full sample and when separated by the 
different exchanges. The first column shows the average Component Shares for all Canadian-
US cross-listings per year. Overall, there has been some time variation in the Component 
Shares, which start at a value of about 56% in 1996. Canadian Component Shares peak 
around the time when the dot com bubble burst and then again in 2002, before they decline, 
reaching a their low in 2006, indicating that the US exchanges were becoming increasingly 
informationally dominant over this period.  However, during 2007 and 2008 we see a marked 
increase in price discovery in the Canadian market at the expense of the US exchanges and 
wind up with Canada having a greater share of price discovery than in 1996.   
 
< Insert Figure 2 Here > 
When we look at the exchange specific averages in columns 2-4 of Table 2 and Figure 2 we 
also see considerable time variation. Both the NYSE and NASDAQ display a similar pattern 
over time in the component shares. Both exchanges have somewhat stable component shares 
until the 2000-2002 period were we see the Canadian component shares increase. From 2002 
until 2006-2007 there is a decrease of around 23% in the component shares, indicating that 
the NYSE and NASDAQ were increasing their share of price discovery at the expense of the 
TSX. In the period since 2007 however the shares have changed dramatically with a marked 
switch back to Canada for price discovery. In both cases component shares in 2009 are at 
roughly the same level as the late 1990’s. For Canadian companies listing on the AMEX we 
see a very different pattern, namely the Canadian component shares increase almost every 
year. The decreasing contribution of the AMEX suggests that this exchange is becoming 
increasingly less important for Canadian companies, despite the large numbers listed on this 
exchange at the end of the sample period.  
< Insert Figure 3 Here > 
 
The patterns for US companies cross-listing to the Toronto Stock Exchange are different in 
some respects, although again they show considerable time variation in Figure 3. With the 
Canadian firms we saw an impact around the time of the dot-com bubble which resulted in 
Canadian component shares increasing. However, for US firms we see little evidence of the 
dot-com bubble in either the total sample or for the NASDAQ firms. In general the patterns 
are less clear for the US firms, most likely a result of the greatly reduced number of 
observations per year which mean additions and removals to the sample may have a 
noticeable impact. For the total sample we see a decline in component shares until around 
2002, by which stage the share of price discovery for the Canadian market has nearly halved. 
Between 2002 and 2006 component shares are roughly stable with several spikes. However, 
as with the Canadian cross-listings to the US, from 2007 we see a dramatic increase in the 
Canadian component share of the US firms, a doubling in just four years to 51.1%. This 
pattern is roughly the same for both firms from the NYSE and the NASDAQ.  
 
The patterns in the price discovery offer some interesting insights into the nature of the 
competition between exchanges and potential future developments. Carpentier et al. (2007) 
argued that the Canadian market was in a losing fight with the US exchanges and was likely 
to eventually be dominated by them. Their concern was what they saw as an inevitable 
process where one dominant market would arise and squeeze out smaller exchanges like the 
TSX. However, as shown by the component shares, what we observe is more in line with 
what Harris et al. (2002) finds, namely an ebb and flow in price discovery as markets gain or 
lose competitiveness over time. For Canadian firms in particular we see marked retreats back 
home for price discovery in the 2000-2002 period and around the GFC. Further, the argument 
that the Toronto exchange is bound to lose also appears premature. The TSX appears to be 
dominating the AMEX market for both Canadian firms and for US firms. This maybe a result 
of the nature of the companies, which are clustered in resource based areas. If so, this would 
suggest that the arguments of Coffee (2002) who argues that exchanges will not necessarily 
disappear but will instead specialize may well be accurate.  
 
Liquidity and Trading Measures 
In Table 3 we show several measures of liquidity and trading activity over time. Price 
discovery should be driven, at least in part, by factors like spreads and liquidity. In highly 
integrated markets investors have a choice of trading location, either their home market or the 
foreign market. In theory at least, investors will prefer to trade in the cheaper and more liquid 
market. As such, even trading based on information created in the home market maybe 
impounded into the foreign prices first. Therefore, changes in the relative trading activity 
between the two markets, and the relative cost of trading may provide insights into the nature 
of the competition between exchanges.  
< Insert Table 3 Here > 
 
In Panel A of Table 3 we report relative liquidity measures for the Canadian market relative 
to the US stock market.
4
 All relative measures are calculated as the Canadian value divided 
by the US value. The first column reports the relative percentage spread. Overall, we observe 
an upward trend in the relative spread up to 2006. An increase in relative spread suggests 
Canadian spreads have lost competitiveness against the US. However, from 2007 onwards the 
relative spreads decrease. In the first two columns of Panel B of Table 3, we show the 
percentage spreads in both markets as a way of seeing whether changes in the relative 
measures are being driven by changes in a particular market. Over time we see that Canadian 
percentage spreads increase in the period 1996-2000, while the US spreads actually decrease 
until 1999. Surprisingly, while the relative spreads increase, making Canada less competitive, 
Canadian component shares increase. After a spike in US spreads in 2000, the year of the dot-
com bubble, we see a period of marked declines in spreads on both markets. Around 2000 
and 2001 most of the US exchanges moved to decimilised spreads which may explain the 
rapid decline between 2001 and 2003. Interestingly, around the same time spreads in Canada 
also reduce, although not as sharply. This period also represents the first point in time where 
spreads in the US are cheaper on average than in Canada. While this does not perfectly 
coincide with the period of US gains in price discovery in the period 2003-2006, it likely 
plays a role in the US improvements in the component shares. Further, the period from 2008 
sees Canada become the cheaper market, which also coincides with the TSX regaining a 
                                                 
4
Relative numbers are computed for the cross-listed stocks that are in our sample.   
considerable amount of the contribution to price discovery. The relationship with spreads is 
not perfect and it does not explain well the period 2000-2002 or 2007-2009.  
<Insert Figure 4 Here > 
 
In Column 3 of Panel A of Table 3, we report the relative number of quotes (i.e. the number 
of quotes issued on the TSX versus the number of quotes issued on the US markets for the 
cross-listed stocks in our sample). From 1996 onwards the relative number of quotes 
decreases considerably starting off at a situation where the TSX number of quotes is 4 times 
as high as the US markets and going down to 0.8, where the number of quotes on the US 
market is 1.25 higher than the TSX. From 2005 onwards the relative number of quotes 
increases again up to 2009. To determine what causes this pattern in relative number of 
quotes we turn to the absolute number of quotes reported in Panel B. We can clearly see an 
uptrend in quoting activity in both markets. In the earlier part of the sample, US quoting 
activity increased more than that in Canada. In the later part of the sample, from 2006 
onwards, the quoting frequency in Canada grows at a faster rate, roughly doubling in number 
each year between 2005 and 2008. Again however, the changes in quoting activity do not 
appear to correlate well with the changes component shares. Neither the marked spikes in 
2000 and 2002 appear related, although there are slight increases in relative quotes in those 
years. In addition, the number of relative quotes starts to increase in 2004, the middle of the 
period where Canadian component shares are decreasing. 
 
The fourth column in Panel A of Table 3 reports the relative number of trades. Interestingly, 
we observe that the relative number of trades has remained relatively consistently high up to 
1999, where it increases sharply in 2000. However, in 2001 we see a sharp decrease to 3.6 
followed by a period of gradual decline until 2005. Again we see the increase in the relative 
measure in the 2007-2009 period. Panel B reveals that this big drop in relative trades is 
mainly due to a large increase in the trades occurring in the US markets. While trades 
increase in both markets, there is faster growth in US trades, particularly from 1997 until 
2008. In particular we see a big increase in trade numbers in the US markets in 2001 and 
again in 2003. Canadian companies actually enjoy greater trading numbers in the US from 
2003-2006 after which we see a significant increase in Canadian trading. The pattern in 
trades appears to explain reasonably well the patterns in the component shares. The higher 
Canadian trade numbers up until 2000 is matched by the slight increases in Canadian 
component shares. The second spike in component shares in 2002 doesn’t appear well related 
to relative trades, but we then see a period where the US is the more liquid market on average 
which coincides with the gains made by the US exchanges in price discovery.   
 
The fourth column in Panel A of Table 3 reports the relative volume, which shows a very 
similar pattern to the relative number of trades, i.e. relative volume stays relatively high up to 
2000, and then drops considerably in 2001. After 2001 we see that the relative volume 
continues to decrease until 2006 at which point it again starts to climb. Panel B shows similar 
patterns to the trade numbers, with growth in most years for the volumes traded in both 
Canada and the US. For the US we see that growth in volume increases significantly around 
2000 before slowing down in 2003. Also of note is the decline in volume traded in the US 
from 2007 onwards. While this explains some of the increase in relative volume, there is also 
a significant increase in volume traded in Canada in 2007. As with the relative trades, the 
volume fits the changes in component shares reasonably well, with the 2000-2002 period still 
not well explained.  
 
The results of all four measures of liquidity and trading activity show similar patterns. 
Initially Canada is in a superior position to the US markets for Canadian cross-listed 
companies although the US gains ground in spreads and quotes. Sometime around 2000-2001 
we see that the there is a marked change in the speed with which the US gains against the 
Toronto Stock Exchange. This growth spurt may be the result of the decimalization which 
occurred around 2000 and certainly appears to have had a marked impact on spreads. The 
other apparent pattern in the data relates to the period around 2006 and 2007. This appears to 
represent a high water mark for the US exchanges against the Toronto exchange and in 2007 
we see the TSX regain lost ground. 2007 coincides with the start of the Global Financial 
Crisis and it may be that during the crisis period resulted in investors being less willing to 
invest in foreign shares, causing a flight back to the home market, or it may be that the US 
exchanges were disproportionately affected by the crisis. In support of the later, we see a 
worsening in all measures for both exchanges, but the changes for the US exchanges are 
larger.  
 Table 4 presents the same four measures of liquidity and trading but for the US companies 
cross-listing into Canada. The smaller numbers of observations in each year make the trends 
and patterns less clear and therefore harder to interpret. Again we start with the relative 
spreads. The relative spreads do not appear to have a consistent trend in the data. Likewise, 
when we look at the spreads on both exchanges there are few apparent trends in either 
market. Spreads stay fairly consistent over much of the sample period with a period of lower 
spreads in the US between 2002 and 2007. Although we do observe what appears to be an 
increase in spreads around the time of the GFC.  
< Insert Table 4 Here > 
 
Column 2 of Panel A presents the relative number of quotes for the two countries. There is a 
noticable decline in relative quotes between 1996, when Canada was providing more of the 
quoting, and 2002, when the US is providing nearly twice as many quotes. However, after 
this period we see a reversal, with the quoting activity on the Toronto Exchange gaining and 
eventually ending in a stronger position than it started in 1996. When we look at the per 
country values in Panel B we do see that both countries observe an increase in the average 
quotes produced. The US grows sharply in the early years such that in 2002 there are on 
average nearly twice the quotes. At that point however the Canadian exchange starts to grow 
more rapidly. Changes in the relative quotes also track reasonably well with the changes 
observed in the component shares with the same decline in component shares until 2002, 
although the stagnant period in component shares between 2003 and 2007 is not reflected in 
the increasing relative quotes.  
< Insert Figure 5 > 
 
Column 3 of Panel A presents the relative trades. We observe a similar pattern to that of the 
relative quotes, namely a relatively long period over which the relative trades reduce, 
indicating that more trades are being executed on the US exchanges. However, unlike quotes 
we observe a marked increase around the 2000-2002. After 2004 the relative trades increase 
over the rest of the sample period. When we look at the average numbers we see that up until 
2000 more trades are being executed on the TSX. This drops away sharply, and may be a 
consequence of either new cross-listings or companies that have dropped out of the sample. 
Of note, we do not see much growth in the number of trades executed in Canada until around 
2007, while the US sample shows quite steady growth up until around 2006. The growth in 
Canadian trades maybe explained by the AMEX listings as it occurs around the time that 
listings on the AMEX increase markedly. Of note, while the TSX has considerable growth in 
its quoting activity, the trade numbers up until 2007 stay very low and show little evidence of 
increasing. This may be due to the much higher spreads resulting in investors choosing to 
trade in the cheaper venue. Unlike for the Canadian cross-listed companies, relative trades do 
not appear well related to the changes in component shares.  
 
Column 4 of Panel confirms the patterns seen in the relative trades when we look at relative 
volumes. Again we see a decline in relative volume that lasts until roughly 2006, with an 
increase in 2001. Around 2007 relative volume starts to increase again. Columns 7 and 8 of 
Panel B present similar patterns to those observed in relative trades, little to no growth in the 
volume traded in Canada until roughly 2007 at which point we see a marked increase in the 
volume traded. The US volume numbers however demonstrate reasonably consistent growth. 
Given the timing of the turnaround in Canadian volume traded, the increase in the AMEX 
firms listing on the TSX may explain the growth in volume. Again, the relative volume 
numbers do not appear related to the changes in component shares.  
 
As with the Canadian firms listing on the US exchanges, we see similar patterns across the 
four measures. Initially the Toronto Stock Exchange loses ground to the US exchanges, 
particularly in terms of little evidence of a growth in trades and volume, until around the 
2007 period where the Toronto exchange gains both trades and volumes. This coincides with 
the period when more AMEX firms move onto the TSX and may support the idea of an 
evolutionary process in exchange competition. What we do not see is evidence that the US 
exchanges are making the Canadian exchanges irrelevant for US companies.  
 
Survivors Sample 
As a robustness check for the patterns we identify in the full sample, and to ensure that the 
changes in component shares and the trade and liquidity measures are not driven by new 
cross-listings or the removal of firms (as a result of delisting on one or both exchanges), we 
look at a sub-sample of just those firms that were cross-listed over the entire sample period. 
This significantly reduces the size of the sample as just 19 companies were cross-listed for 
the entire 14 year sample. After we exclude several companies that were missing a number of 
firm-year observations we were left with just 17 companies and 228 firm years
5
. Further, no 
US companies listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange covered the entire 14 year period. As a 
result, we do not analyze the US companies cross-listing onto the TSX.  
 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the component shares for the Canadian companies listing on the 
US exchanges. The first column presents the full sample average per year. The component 
shares are broadly supportive of the full sample findings. We find on average the home 
exchange is the dominant market for price discovery although the average is only just above 
50% in most years. Further the patterns shown in the full-sample are equally evident for just 
those stocks that survived the entire period. We see an initial decline in price discovery in 
Canada until around 2002 at which point the component shares increase sharply. After that 
we again see the component shares decline to a low in 2006, before we witness an even 
sharper reversion back to Canada, possibly due to the GFC. This pattern is repeated almost 
exactly in both the NYSE and NASDAQ. The AMEX pattern is slightly different in that the 
low point occurs in 2004 after which the TSX recovers its component share and then stays 
relatively stable over the rest of the period with only a slight jump in 2008 and 2009.  
< Insert Table 5 Here > 
 
Panel B provides the trade and liquidity averages per year for the 17 companies that survived 
the entire period. Column 1 presents the percentage spreads in each of the markets. Spreads 
in Canada start off lower, with spreads in both markets relatively static until 2000 when they 
increase sharply. Following this spike in 2000, spreads in both markets fall sharply to levels 
lower than in the 1990’s, although the spreads in the US fall by a greater amount and are 
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 In most cases this was a result of either having too few trading days, non-stationarity or no-cointegrating 
relationship in a particular firm year. As a result we remove two companies that had less than 10 of the 14 firm-
year observations. 10 of the 17 remaining companies had 14 firm-year observations.  
actually lower than in Canada. This reduction in US spreads appears to drive an increase in 
quoting, trading and volume in the US. However, while there is a sharp increase in trading 
and volume, the component share in the US falls around this period. Spreads in both markets 
continue to fall although the US remains lower until 2007 when both markets see increases in 
spreads, likely as a result of the market instability at the time.  
< Insert Figure 6 > 
 
Around 2003 we also see quoting and trade activity in the US overtake Canada. This activity 
continues to be greater until 2005, after which the Toronto market overtakes the US 
exchanges again, with particularly strong gains in 2008. The results suggest that there is a 
relationship between the trading and quoting activity on the markets and the changes in 
component shares. In the period between 2003 and 2005 we see US component shares 
improve markedly at the same time as they become the larger market for trading and quoting 
in the companies. However, the relationship is not complete, in 2006 we see the lowest 
component shares, yet the importance of the Canadian market for trading and quoting has 
greatly improved. Further, the spike in component shares in 2002 appears unrelated to any of 
the measures. The 2000-2002 and the 2007-2009 periods however do represent crisis periods, 
which may suggest that price discovery reverts to the home market in such periods.  
 
As a further robustness check on the trends in the component shares, we split the sample by 
four measures that should influence the relative contributions to price discovery. We split the 
sample by calculating the firm average of each measure. Based on the firm average over the 
years that a company is cross-listed we then calculate the top and bottom 30% of firms. The 
first factor we split the sample by is the percentage of sales occurring in the US. One 
argument used to explain cross-listing destination is that companies list where they have sales 
as a way of overcoming with a lack of investor familiarity with the company (). Therefore we 
would expect companies with more US sales to be more familiar to US investors and possibly 
result in more price discovery occurring in the US. Panel A of Table 6 indicates that the firms 
with higher US sales have a lower Canadian component share. In fact, for firms with a high 
percentage of their sales in the US, the US exchanges are dominant with an average 
contribution to price discovery of 55%. By contrast, for firms with low US sales the TSX 
contributes on average 68% of the price discovery.  
 
The second factor we employ is market capitalization, as larger firms are more likely to 
receive attention from US investors, media and analysts. The results do not support this 
however. Smaller firms have more price discovery in the US, nearly 50%, while larger firms 
retain more price discovery at home. However, the gap is much smaller, roughly 10%. The 
third factor is relative trade numbers, calculated as the number of Canadian trades divided by 
the number of US trades. The low relative trade group, or those companies with a greater 
number of US trades, have a greater US contribution to price discovery, averaging 37%, 
while those with more Canadian trades have a much higher Canadian component share, 77%. 
The final factor we employ is relative spread, calculated as the ratio of Canadian percentage 
spreads to US percentage spreads. Leiberman et al. (1999) and Hasbrouck (1995) both show 
that the ratio of spreads between two exchanges is a key determinant of the relative 
contribution to price discovery between the exchanges. As Panel A shows, those firms with 
low Canadian spreads (low relative spread) have on average 77% of their component shares 
on the TSX. Those firms with higher relative spreads in Canada on the other hand have just 
39% of their price discovery in Canada. Further, we see that there is a greatly reduced 
standard deviation for the low relative spread group and high relative trade group. The four 
factors all appear to explain differences in the level of the price discovery contributions of the 
US and Canadian exchanges.  
 
Panel B presents the Canadian component shares for each of the sub-samples over time. In 
almost every case we see a similar pattern occur. Canadian component shares increase around 
the period 2000-2002 with a peak in 2002, after which the US contributions increase as 
Canadian component shares decrease, which represents the lowest point for the Canadian 
component shares. As with the earlier results, we see a significant increase in the component 
shares during the 2007-2009 period, around the time of the GFC. This pattern remains 
consistent irrespective of how we separate the sample and is strongly suggestive that our 
results are being driven by changes in the competitive position of the markets, potentially for 
information trades. Of particular note is the effect of the two periods 2000-2002, around the 
period after the dot-com bubble bursts along with the crises in corporate governance in the 
wake of Enron, and 2007-2009, the GFC period. The results suggest that at least for Canadian 
companies price discovery reverts to the home market in a crisis period.  
 
Figures 7-10 show graphically the component shares of the high and low measure groups for 
each of the four determinants of the level of price discovery. Three of the four graphs, namely 
those for US sales, relative trades and relative spreads, show that while the measures explain 
the level of price discovery for a particular firm, they do not appear to explain the changes 
over time in the relative contributions to price discovery of the US and Canadian markets. 
Particularly for trades and spreads the two lines move in similar fashions and appear to track 
each other reasonably well. The graph for US sales shows a similar tracking after 2001, 
although prior to that point there appears to be some convergence. Only market value offers a 
different picture with the two groups converging around 2006, although only for a brief 
period before they begin to move apart again. The graphs also do not support the belief that 
the Canadian component shares are decreasing noticeably over time, instead looking more 
like the ebb and flow process described in Harris et al. (2002).  
< Insert Figures 7-10 > 
7. Conclusion 
 
Given the increasing integration of markets around the world, concerns have been expressed 
about the survival of smaller national exchanges in competition with larger, more liquid 
exchanges. Several theories have been put forward regarding the likely long-term survival of 
smaller exchanges, but little actual empirical evidence has been presented to suggest which of 
the theories, if any, are correct. Much of the evidence that has been presented to date looks at 
the Canadian stock exchanges. Canada and the US have undergone decades of integration 
allowing Canadian firms and investors easy access to US markets. Canadian firms also 
represent the largest block of foreign companies cross-listed on the US exchanges. Evidence 
in this setting therefore offers useful insights into the likely consequences for other smaller 
exchanges in other parts of the world that are now undergoing similar integration efforts. 
Measures of the relative contributions to price discovery also offer an excellent way of 
looking at the competitiveness of exchanges. However, few papers have measured price 
discovery over a long time period so to date evidence on the evolutionary development of 
price discovery has not been explored.  
  
Our findings show little evidence that the Toronto Stock Exchange is systematically losing 
ground to the US exchanges, either in relation to price discovery or trading and liquidity 
measures. We do however find that there is time variation in the contributions to price 
discovery of the various exchanges. Specifically, overall we find that the home exchange 
dominates price discovery, but for Canadian companies the overall average Canadian 
component share reaches a low point in 2006 where the US is slightly dominant. However, 
particularly during crisis periods we see that price discovery migrates to the Canadian 
exchange, particularly during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The patterns also differ 
depending on the exchange firms are listing to or from. In particular we find that the AMEX 
exchange has lost competitiveness to the TSX fairly consistently over the sample period. We 
also find only mixed evidence that the change in component shares are related to changes in 
trading and liquidity measures, in particular relative spreads, trading and quoting activity and 
volume traded. Overall the results appear to support the findings of Harris et al. (2002) that 
the competitive position of exchanges will ebb and flow as they compete.  
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Table 1: Number of Cross-listings per year 
 
 Canadian Cross-listings US Cross-listings 
Year Total NYSE 
Listings 
NASDAQ 
Listings 
AMEX 
Listings 
Total NYSE 
Listings 
NASDAQ 
Listings 
AMEX 
Listings 
1996 43 20 14 9 7 2 3 2 
1997 64 30 21 13 9 5 2 2 
1998 68 32 24 12 12 6 5 1 
1999 77 35 30 12 12 6 6 0 
2000 90 39 38 13 13 9 4 0 
2001 91 39 43 9 12 7 5 0 
2002 94 45 37 12 12 7 4 1 
2003 102 44 42 16 12 7 3 2 
2004 116 47 41 28 7 5 2 0 
2005 125 50 43 32 11 7 3 1 
2006 129 51 39 39 12 6 4 2 
2007 132 49 35 48 19 4 6 9 
2008 129 45 36 48 20 3 6 11 
2009 121 36 35 50 17 3 3 11 
Note: This table reports the number of cross-listings per year from the TSX to the various 
markets in the US. We report the total number of cross-listings and cross-listings on the 
NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex, respectively. 
Table 2: Canadian Component Shares by Exchange and Country 
Panel A: Component Shares By Exchange for Canadian Companies Cross-listings 
 Average Std Dev Min Max Number 
TOTAL 0.5718 0.2177 0.0269 0.9939 1,381 
NYSE 0.6331 0.2024 0.0738 0.9939 562 
NASDAQ 0.4351 0.2042 0.0269 0.9426 478 
AMEX 0.6624 0.1600 0.1122 0.9570 341 
Panel B: Component Shares By Exchange for US Companies Cross-listings 
 Average Std Dev Min Max Number 
TOTAL 
0.3772 0.2520 0.0120 0.9199 170 
NYSE 
0.3873 0.2287 0.0261 0.8134 56 
NASDAQ 
0.2652 0.2303 0.0120 0.9199 73 
AMEX 
0.5627 0.2064 0.0634 0.8644 41 
Panel C: Component Shares by Time 
 Canadian Companies US Companies 
 Total NYSE NASDAQ AMEX Total NYSE NASDAQ AMEX 
1996 0.5630 0.6930 0.3714 0.5720 0.4585 0.3079 0.4521 0.6282 
1997 0.5645 0.6393 0.4670 0.5493 0.3882 0.3310 0.5861 0.3335 
1998 0.5756 0.6673 0.4585 0.5653 0.4010 0.2792 0.5223 0.5261 
1999 0.5775 0.6707 0.4652 0.5860 0.3893 0.2674 0.5112 - 
2000 0.5912 0.6713 0.5105 0.5868 0.3733 0.3288 0.4621 - 
2001 0.5768 0.6783 0.4769 0.6145 0.2774 0.2292 0.3449 - 
2002 0.6233 0.7282 0.5159 0.5607 0.2430 0.2349 0.2502 0.2712 
2003 0.5867 0.6717 0.4782 0.6378 0.3134 0.2406 0.2564 0.6538 
2004 0.5677 0.6261 0.4356 0.6629 0.2562 0.1779 0.4128 - 
2005 0.5250 0.5701 0.3543 0.6841 0.3761 0.3072 0.3519 0.8624 
2006 0.4873 0.5003 0.2783 0.6793 0.2428 0.1424 0.1655 0.6987 
2007 0.5446 0.4986 0.3833 0.7091 0.3961 0.2317 0.3355 0.5096 
2008 0.6305 0.6735 0.4311 0.7396 0.4970 0.3490 0.3325 0.6271 
2009 0.6122 0.6895 0.4590 0.6637 0.5112 0.3911 0.5300 0.5389 
Table 3: Trading and Liquidity Measures for Canadian Cross-listed Companies  
Panel A: Relative Measures 
 Relative Spreads Relative # of Quotes Relative # of Trades Relative Volume 
1996 0.718 4.284 6.643 11.561 
1997 0.824 2.076 5.248 9.86 
1998 0.867 1.439 5.169 8.8 
1999 0.94 1.232 5.17 8.217 
2000 0.958 1.357 7.374 9.688 
2001 1.154 1.079 3.593 6.448 
2002 1.129 1.142 3.666 6.857 
2003 1.18 0.871 2.627 5.501 
2004 1.295 0.809 2.319 4.391 
2005 1.278 0.918 2.318 3.596 
2006 1.315 1.386 2.367 3.487 
2007 1.076 1.696 2.431 4.535 
2008 0.918 2 2.999 4.707 
2009 0.866 2.1 2.783 4.202 
Total 1.07 1.484 3.794 6.568 
Panel B: Per Exchange Measures 
Year 
% Spread 
Canada 
% Spread 
US 
# Quotes 
Canada # Quotes US 
# Trades  
Canada 
# Trades  
US 
Volume 
Canada 
(x10e8) 
Volume 
US 
(x10e8) 
1996 0.0162 0.0245           30,860            13,180      28,245      10,064  0.604 0.332 
1997 0.0183 0.0239           35,553            22,838      30,107      10,139  0.550 0.283 
1998 0.0200 0.0233           50,409            32,964      40,589      13,166  0.654 0.293 
1999 0.0200 0.0222           67,319            48,091      57,826      20,786  0.705 0.331 
2000 0.0208 0.0257         104,623            81,651      90,227      44,560  0.885 0.465 
2001 0.0186 0.0170         165,252          162,337      79,987      61,555  0.920 0.550 
2002 0.0179 0.0162         249,165          278,179      99,100      69,217  1.105 0.609 
2003 0.0102 0.0093         374,816          433,893    106,798    117,141  1.084 0.868 
2004 0.0111 0.0092         547,237          614,912    122,420    148,927  1.047 0.905 
2005 0.0086 0.0074         882,077       1,044,813    179,388    256,216  1.169 1.042 
2006 0.0090 0.0071       1,633,675       1,203,737    266,692    260,987  1.389 1.138 
2007 0.0092 0.0093       3,152,497       2,690,646    401,275    398,576  1.785 1.090 
2008 0.0180 0.0198       5,345,592       3,778,158    672,678    455,542  2.115 1.048 
2009 0.0180 0.0200       4,882,516       3,661,979    463,403    360,898  1.533 0.849 
Total     0.0147      0.0154        1,575,516    1,260,458  226,287  195,098   1.215     0.781  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Trading and Liquidity Measures for US Cross-listed Companies  
Panel A: Relative Measures 
 Relative Spreads Relative # of Quotes Relative # of Trades Relative Volume 
1996 1.617 2.698 2.578 21.605 
1997 3.335 1.965 2.547 11.190 
1998 6.015 1.003 1.729 6.965 
1999 5.203 0.802 1.253 1.311 
2000 3.875 0.945 2.608 1.283 
2001 6.321 0.794 4.106 4.871 
2002 8.475 0.602 2.248 2.058 
2003 5.022 0.641 1.512 2.186 
2004 3.150 0.752 0.261 1.696 
2005 4.116 0.933 0.768 1.401 
2006 4.161 1.073 0.399 0.576 
2007 1.819 1.953 0.809 0.943 
2008 2.490 2.460 0.974 1.145 
2009 2.006 3.051 1.424 2.399 
Total 4.107 1.491 1.591 3.280 
Panel B: Per Exchange Measures 
Year 
% Spread 
Canada 
% Spread 
US 
# Quotes 
Canada # Quotes US 
# Trades  
Canada 
# Trades  
US 
Volume 
Canada 
(x10e8) 
Volume 
US 
(x10e8) 
1996 0.0289 0.0341 2,510 3,613 1,249 3,291 0.671 0.822 
1997 0.0274 0.0149 12,068 14,452 6,133 4,803 1.626 0.813 
1998 0.0523 0.0280 14,536 20,716 11,543 6,346 3.370 1.391 
1999 0.0532 0.0287 18,120 21,848 16,665 7,679 2.678 1.361 
2000 0.0565 0.0307 28,627 26,978 33,197 8,718 6.309 1.868 
2001 0.0639 0.0233 23,010 57,212 8,097 7,740 0.807 0.810 
2002 0.0447 0.0171 89,530 165,459 19,735 35,438 1.344 2.392 
2003 0.0409 0.0196 131,752 212,986 21,180 53,898 1.890 2.045 
2004 0.0154 0.0051 290,688 360,943 4,754 64,459 0.345 3.059 
2005 0.0084 0.0045 618,738 733,676 20,902 136,362 2.299 9.231 
2006 0.0414 0.0062 1,032,996 1,021,188 9,700 160,767 0.387 10.437 
2007 0.0411 0.0141 1,071,383 1,109,432 34,975 161,866 1.637 8.380 
2008 0.0617 0.0285 1,562,288 1,195,274 39,010 156,988 1.852 7.147 
2009 0.0287 0.0210 2,807,066 2,139,156 63,911 229,253 3.997 6.240 
Total 0.0430 0.0201 726,104 643,044 25,127 89,939 2.239 4.553 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Component Shares and Trading and Liquidity Measures for Surviving 
Canadian Cross-listed Companies  
Panel A: Component Shares 
 TOTAL NYSE NASDAQ AMEX 
1996 0.5316 0.7034 0.3691 0.5160 
1997 0.5720 0.6257 0.5535 0.4897 
1998 0.5489 0.6429 0.4480 0.5729 
1999 0.5364 0.6382 0.4084 0.6284 
2000 0.5026 0.6067 0.3580 0.5491 
2001 0.5181 0.6396 0.3589 0.7815 
2002 0.5990 0.7136 0.4573 0.6152 
2003 0.5540 0.6653 0.4349 0.5725 
2004 0.5383 0.6762 0.3904 0.5614 
2005 0.4866 0.5751 0.3302 0.6449 
2006 0.4225 0.4908 0.2588 0.6452 
2007 0.4796 0.5447 0.3459 0.6395 
2008 0.5579 0.6716 0.3849 0.6963 
2009 0.6656 0.8075 0.5128 0.6913 
Panel B: Trade and Liquidity Measures 
Year 
% Spread 
Canada 
% Spread 
US 
# Quotes 
Canada # Quotes US 
# Trades  
Canada 
# Trades  
US 
Volume 
Canada 
(x10e8) 
Volume 
US 
(x10e8) 
1996 0.0127 0.0163 44,016 18,170 42,548 14,655 7.32 5.14 
1997 0.0145 0.0202 53,323 32,735 48,172 14,318 7.67 4.04 
1998 0.0148 0.0145 87,713 51,383 74,412 25,079 11.04 5.15 
1999 0.0146 0.0157 115,267 76,027 99,505 38,307 10.73 5.75 
2000 0.0252 0.0315 172,086 112,791 165,237 58,656 14.77 8.57 
2001 0.0088 0.0067 300,012 276,568 137,938 105,171 14.48 10.01 
2002 0.0089 0.0084 393,346 387,014 158,487 123,927 16.40 11.22 
2003 0.0068 0.0053 550,324 552,168 155,364 154,992 13.09 11.39 
2004 0.0064 0.0046 801,684 850,397 185,677 233,885 13.80 12.11 
2005 0.0044 0.0031 1,190,035 1,232,194 263,671 290,835 15.37 12.02 
2006 0.0044 0.0029 2,244,403 1,690,330 423,935 410,996 19.68 15.42 
2007 0.0048 0.0034 4,132,870 3,443,631 587,648 499,022 23.71 13.61 
2008 0.0107 0.0079 7,623,763 5,273,664 1,042,234 578,616 30.26 12.68 
2009 0.0061 0.0053 9,408,934 6,201,411 926,432 551,248 22.42 11.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Component Shares Seperated by Price Discovery Determinants 
 
 
Low US 
Sales 
High US 
Sales 
Low MV High MV 
Low 
Rel_Trades 
High 
Rel_Trades 
Low 
Rel_Spread 
High 
Rel_Spread 
Average 0.6767 0.4528 0.5124 0.6180 0.3714 0.7674 0.7733 0.3902 
Median 0.6769 0.4677 0.5430 0.6429 0.3694 0.7881 0.7811 0.3850 
Std Dev 0.2232 0.2057 0.1958 0.2184 0.1710 0.1348 0.1107 0.1753 
 
  
      
Panel B: Trade and Liquidity Measures 
Year 
Low US 
Sales 
High US 
Sales 
Low MV High MV 
Low 
Rel_Trades 
High 
Rel_Trades 
Low 
Rel_Spread 
High 
Rel_Spread 
1996 0.8024 0.4658 0.4135 0.6569 0.3209 0.7188 0.6907 0.2786 
1997 0.7355 0.4243 0.4442 0.6576 0.3854 0.7423 0.7158 0.3678 
1998 0.7774 0.4028 0.4698 0.6721 0.3738 0.7680 0.7610 0.3848 
1999 0.7350 0.4307 0.4487 0.6804 0.3553 0.7501 0.7746 0.4184 
2000 0.7421 0.5262 0.5426 0.6644 0.4011 0.7890 0.8008 0.4358 
2001 0.6763 0.5450 0.4969 0.6555 0.3825 0.8223 0.8125 0.4249 
2002 0.7713 0.5011 0.5254 0.6895 0.4399 0.8669 0.8684 0.4762 
2003 0.6480 0.4722 0.5258 0.6342 0.4096 0.8134 0.8127 0.4412 
2004 0.6389 0.4183 0.5209 0.6003 0.3651 0.7805 0.8031 0.3700 
2005 0.6135 0.3954 0.4761 0.5339 0.2947 0.7522 0.7953 0.3046 
2006 0.5218 0.3783 0.4564 0.4722 0.2615 0.6902 0.7373 0.2661 
2007 0.5940 0.4089 0.5538 0.4875 0.3384 0.6967 0.7460 0.3318 
2008 0.7351 0.5224 0.5872 0.6766 0.4252 0.8031 0.8187 0.4435 
2009 0.6825 0.4925 0.5374 0.7205 0.4468 0.7830 0.7488 0.4782 
 
 
Figure 1: Component Shares for Canadian and US Cross-listed Companies by Year 
 
 
Figure 2: Component Shares for Canadian Companies by Exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Component Shares for US Companies by Exchange 
 
 
Figure 4: Component Shares and Trading and Liquidity Measures for Canadian 
Companies by Year 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Component Shares and Trading and Liquidity Measures for US Companies 
by Year 
 
 
Figure 6: Component Shares for Surviving Canadian Companies by Exchange 
 
Figure 7: Component Shares by High and Low US Sales  Figure 8: Component Shares by High and Low Market Value 
   
Figure 9: Component Shares by High and Low Relative Trades Figure 10: Component Shares by High and Low Relative Spreads 
    
